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OPINION  OF  THE  COURT 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, with whom McKEE, Chief Judge, 
SLOVITER, SCIRICA, RENDELL, FUENTES, SMITH, 
FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN, 
GREENAWAY, Jr., VANASKIE, and ALDISERT, Circuit 
Judges, join. 
    
  Keenan Quinn appeals his jury conviction for aiding 
and abetting codefendant Shawn Johnson in an armed bank 
robbery.  Quinn’s defense was that, when he drove Johnson to 
National Penn Bank on the morning of the robbery, he did not 
know that Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint.  
Quinn hoped Johnson would testify on his behalf at trial, but 
Johnson—who was awaiting sentencing on the robbery 
charges—invoked his Fifth Amendment protection against 
self-incrimination and refused to testify.  The District Court’s 
refusal of Quinn’s request to immunize Johnson so he could 
testify was, Quinn contends, an error, for without it he was 
unable to rebut the Government’s accusations against him.   
 
 Quinn also alleges (though belatedly) prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Specifically, he asserts that the Government 
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postponed Johnson’s sentencing until after Quinn’s trial to 
induce Johnson to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. 
 
 We have recognized two situations in which a criminal 
defendant may be entitled to have a defense witness receive 
immunity for his testimony.  The first, grounded in 
prosecutorial misconduct, occurs when the Government acts 
“with the deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact 
finding process” (for example, by threatening a defense 
witness).  United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204 (3d 
Cir. 1978); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 
1976).  If prosecutorial misconduct occurs, the charges are 
dismissed unless the Government chooses to immunize the 
witness at a new trial. 
 
 We recognized a second situation in Government of 
the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980)—
even without evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, if the 
Government has refused to immunize the witness, the 
defendant is entitled to immunity for his witness if the 
testimonial evidence is “clearly exculpatory and essential to 
the defense case and . . . the government has no strong 
interest in withholding use immunity.”  Id. at 974.  If those 
requirements (detailed in a five-part test) are met, the District 
Court, as a new remedy accorded by Smith, may on its own 
authority immunize that witness to allow his testimony.  Id. at 
971–72.   
 
 No statute or Supreme Court ruling authorizes judicial 
grants of immunity for a defense witness (called for 
convenience judicial use immunity).  We are the only Court 
of Appeals that permits a trial court to immunize a defense 
witness.  Every other Court of Appeals has rejected this 
5 
 
theory of judicial power.  Today we do so as well, and 
overturn that part of Smith that recognizes judicial grants of 
immunity.  Immunity is a statutory creation, bestowed by 
Congress on the Executive Branch through the federal 
witness immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003.  The 
decision to immunize a witness to obtain his testimony is a 
core prosecutorial function, as immunizing necessarily 
involves weighing the public’s need for testimony against the 
risk that immunity will inhibit later prosecution of criminal 
wrongdoing.  We, in our corner of the Judiciary, now step 
away from our reach into this prosecutorial realm. 
 
 Though we abandon the judicial use immunity remedy 
created in Smith, we retain its five-part test for determining 
whether the Government’s refusal to grant defense witness 
immunity denies a defendant due process.  We created this 
test in Smith because we feared our then-existing test for 
prosecutorial misconduct—acts taken with an intent to distort 
the factfinding process—did not ensure the defendant’s right 
to present an effective and meaningful defense when the 
prosecutor refused to immunize a witness.  Smith asks 
whether the Government has refused to immunize a witness 
in order to keep clearly exculpatory and essential testimony 
from trial without a strong countervailing reason.  If so, this is 
a type of prosecutorial misconduct.  The Smith test thus 
complements our existing prosecutorial misconduct test.    
However, the remedy for a due process violation, rather than 
intruding into the prosecutor’s province by judicial grants of 
immunity, is a retrial where the Government can cure the 
distortion caused by its wrongdoing or face dismissal of the 
relevant charges.   
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  Applying both the prosecutorial misconduct test that 
existed before and after Smith (acts taken with the deliberate 
intent to distort the factfinding process) and the 
complementary test we created in Smith (exclusion of clearly 
exculpatory and essential testimony without a strong 
countervailing government interest) to Quinn’s case, we hold 
that the Government did not engage in wrongdoing.  We 
cannot conclude it deliberately distorted the factfinding 
process by delaying Johnson’s sentencing.  No evidence 
demonstrates that the Government’s action had any effect on 
Johnson’s decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment right not 
to incriminate himself by his testimony.  Nor did the 
Government keep clearly exculpatory testimony from 
Quinn’s trial by refusing to immunize Johnson.  We thus 
affirm.     
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
 A. The Bank Robbery  
 
 On the morning of August 27, 2009, Quinn met 
Johnson in a parking lot at the Henderson Square shopping 
mall in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.  Quinn drove Johnson 
across the parking lot to the National Penn Bank, located 
within the same shopping mall.  While Johnson went into the 
bank, Quinn drove his car behind another store, and out of 
sight of those in the bank.   
 
 Once inside, Johnson handed a check to one of the 
tellers.  When she requested identification from Johnson, the 
teller realized Johnson had a gun pointed at her and that a 
note written on the back of the check demanded money.  
Johnson took several thousand dollars in cash from the teller 
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and another bank employee transferring cash from the bank 
vault.  Unknown to Johnson, the money he was given 
contained a global positioning system (“GPS”) tracker hidden 
inside a bundle of bills.  Johnson left the bank and returned to 
Quinn, who was still waiting in his car behind the nearby 
store, and the two drove away. 
 
 Quinn and Johnson went to a nearby townhouse owned 
by Quinn’s aunt.  There, Johnson discovered the GPS tracker 
and attempted to disable it by hitting it and submerging it in a 
bowl of water.  He was unsuccessful.  The Upper Merion 
Police Department used the tracker to locate the men at the 
townhouse, where both shortly surrendered.  Police recovered 
a gun, the GPS tracker, and approximately $9,000 in cash.   
 
 B. The Investigation and Indictment  
 
 Law enforcement officers interviewed both Quinn and 
Johnson that afternoon.  Quinn told the officers that he did 
not know that Johnson planned to rob the National Penn 
Bank.  Johnson confessed to the robbery, as well as another 
bank robbery he had committed a month earlier and a 
fraudulent check cashing scheme.  He also told police that 
Quinn did not know he (Johnson) intended to rob National 
Penn.  Beyond that statement, Johnson “was hesitant to talk 
about Quinn because Quinn is the brother of [Johnson’s] 
fiancee.” 
 
 The United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania indicted both Quinn and Johnson for armed 
bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d), and using 
and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of 
violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  Johnson was also 
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indicted for the earlier bank robbery and for being a felon in 
possession of a gun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  
Johnson pled guilty to all of the charges in May 2010, and 
was awaiting sentencing in August 2010 when Quinn’s trial 
was scheduled to begin. 
 
 C. Johnson’s Assertion of His Fifth Amendment 
  Privilege 
 
 Prior to the start of Quinn’s trial, his counsel 
discovered that Johnson had been transferred to an out-of-
state prison.  Quinn requested, and was granted, a 
continuance so that Johnson could be returned to 
Pennsylvania and be available to testify.   
 
 In response to this continuance, the Government filed a 
motion to postpone Johnson’s sentencing.  It apparently was 
concerned that Johnson, who had already pled guilty to the 
robbery, could shield Quinn from blame without any 
additional cost to himself by testifying that Quinn was not 
involved in that crime.  By delaying Johnson’s sentencing 
until after his testimony, the Government contended it would 
retain the ability to present to the sentencing Court any 
testimony by Johnson it believed to be perjurious. 
 
[I]f Keenan Quinn calls [Johnson] as a witness 
and [Johnson] does not invoke his right against 
self-incrimination, it is possible, if not probable, 
that [Johnson] will commit perjury.  Thus . . . his 
testimony will likely have a direct effect on his 
[sentencing] guidelines and the Court’s analysis 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).   
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Johnson’s only response to the Government’s motion was to 
inform the Court that if either “the codefendant’s counsel or 
the government attempts to call Mr. Johnson as a witness at 
the trial of the codefendant, Mr. Johnson will assert his right 
to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment.”   
 
 As his reply to the Government’s motion to delay and 
Johnson’s statement that he intended to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment, Quinn filed a motion in limine asking the Court 
to exercise its authority under our holding in Smith to 
immunize Johnson so he could testify on Quinn’s behalf 
without fear of prosecution or repercussion at sentencing.  
The Government opposed the motion.  Following briefing and 
oral argument, the Court denied Quinn’s request, and 
declined to reconsider that ruling when Quinn renewed the 
motion at the close of evidence.   
 
 D. Quinn’s Trial 
 
 At trial, the Government introduced phone records 
showing that Quinn called Johnson once the day before the 
robbery and five times in a little over two hours on the 
morning of the robbery.  Evidence of these calls, though 
deleted from the call history on Quinn’s phone before it was 
taken by the police, was revealed through the phone 
company’s documentation.  The Government also presented 
testimony from two of Quinn’s former cellmates, Anthony 
Bennett and Nicholas Mason.  Bennett testified of 
conversations with Quinn whereby the latter had planned a 
crime in which he acted as the driver and hoped to beat the 
charges because his codefendant would “take all of the 
charges.”  Mason testified that Quinn admitted that he and a 
codefendant planned a bank robbery where “[Quinn] stayed 
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parked at a separate location so he would not be linked to the 
crime.” 
 
 Quinn testified in his own defense.  He told the jury 
that he called Johnson once on the morning of the robbery to 
make plans to meet for breakfast.  He claimed that he began 
to drive Johnson to his aunt’s house, where they intended to 
spend the morning, when Johnson directed him to pull in 
front of the bank’s entrance.  As he got out of the car, 
Johnson told Quinn to wait behind a nearby store.  Quinn 
stated that he believed Johnson was going to cash a fraudulent 
check at the bank, something Johnson had done before, but 
did not know that Johnson was going to rob the bank at 
gunpoint.   
 
 Johnson did not testify.  His statement to police that 
Quinn was not aware of the planned robbery was excluded as 
hearsay. 
 
 After a four-day trial, the jury found Quinn guilty of 
aiding and abetting a bank robbery and carrying a firearm in 
relation to a crime of violence.  His sentence was 147 
months’ imprisonment and monetary penalties. 
 
 E. This Appeal 
 
 This appeal followed.  Quinn argues that the District 
Court erred by not exercising its authority under Smith to 
immunize Johnson’s testimony, thus denying Quinn the 
opportunity to present an effective defense.  He also claims 
for the first time that the prosecution’s request to postpone 
Johnson’s sentencing until after Quinn’s trial was intended to 
induce Johnson to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, a 
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deliberate distortion of the factfinding process and thus an act 
of prosecutorial misconduct.  As a remedy, Quinn contends 
his conviction should be vacated and the charges dismissed 
unless Johnson is given immunity to testify at a retrial.  
 
   In response to Quinn’s appeal, the Government 
questioned our unique jurisprudence in this area.  We sua 
sponte elected to hear this case en banc to “reconsider the . . . 
theory of judicial immunity” recognized in Smith.  The parties 
filed supplemental briefs, and we heard argument en banc. 
 
II. Judicial Use Immunity 
 
 A. Our Holding in Smith 
 
 In Smith, three defendants were charged with assault 
and robbery of a man named Phipps.  The Government’s case 
centered on Phipps’ identification of the defendants as his 
assailants.  During the investigation following the assault, 
however, a man named Sanchez told police that he and 
several others—none of whom was among the defendants—
were responsible for the crime.  Smith, 615 F.2d at 966–67. 
 
 Defendants called Sanchez as a witness at their trial, 
but he refused to testify on the basis of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.  Because he was a 
juvenile at the time of the offense, Sanchez was subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands Attorney General, 
who offered to grant immunity to Sanchez if, as a 
prosecutorial courtesy, the United States Attorney prosecuting 
the case consented.  Id. at 967.  When the U.S. Attorney 
refused to consent, the trial proceeded without Sanchez’s 
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testimony or his hearsay statements to police, and all three 
defendants were convicted.  Id. 
 
 Citing our opinion in Morrison, 535 F.2d 223, we held 
that if the Government had refused immunity “with the 
deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process, then 
the district court should enter a judgment of acquittal as to 
defendants . . . unless the government consents to grant 
statutory use immunity to [the witness].”  Smith, 615 F.2d at 
969.  Our Court in Smith called this “statutory immunity,” id., 
though it is more commonly referred to as the prosecutorial 
misconduct theory.  While rarely the basis of a retrial order, 
this theory provides a valuable safeguard against 
prosecutorial overzealousness infringing on the fair trial 
ensured to a criminal defendant.   
 
 Smith went further and held that the trial court could 
itself “grant judicial immunity to the witness” if necessary to 
“vindicate the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial.”  
Id. at 974.  We held that court-granted immunity could be 
used to ensure that the defendant was able to present an 
effective defense if the Government inexplicably refused to 
immunize a defense witness with exculpatory and essential 
testimony.  We first considered this “effective defense” 
theory in United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir. 
1978), but did not establish the test and remedy until two 
years later in Smith.
1
  We refer to this power as “judicial use 
                                              
1
 The idea of immunizing a witness as necessary to secure the 
defendant’s due process right is often traced to a footnote in 
then-Judge Warren Burger’s opinion in Earl v. United States, 
361 F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966).  The theory that a 
defendant could have a due process right to witness testimony 
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immunity” because it involves a court conferring immunity 
without a request from the Government.   
 
 Smith recognized that the judicial grant of immunity 
intruded on the Government’s statutory authority to immunize 
witnesses and prosecutorial discretion to prioritize 
enforcement of the laws.  Thus we held that “opportunities for 
judicial use of this immunity power must be clearly limited.”  
Smith, 615 F.2d at 972.  We created a five-part test—witness 
immunity could be granted only if “[1] properly sought in the 
district court; [2] the defense witness [is] available to testify; 
[3] the proffered testimony [is] clearly exculpatory; [4] the 
testimony [is] essential; and [5] there [are] no strong 
governmental interests which countervail against a grant of 
immunity.”  Id.  These factors balance the Government’s 
discretion in prosecutorial decisions and the defendant’s right 
to present a meaningful defense.  
 
 B. Rejection of Judicial Use Immunity  
 
 As noted, we are the only Court of Appeals that has 
recognized judicial use immunity for witnesses.  United 
                                                                                                     
also gained traction in academic literature.  See, e.g., Donald 
Koblitz, Note, “The Public Has a Claim to Every Man’s 
Evidence”: The Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Witness 
Immunity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211 (1978); Note, The Sixth 
Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense 
Witnesses, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1266 (1978); Helen M. McCue, 
Note, Separation of Powers and Defense Witness Immunity, 
66 Geo. L.J. 51 (1977); Barbara A. Reeves, Note, A Re-
Examination of Defense Witness Immunity: A New Use for 
Kastigar, 10 Harv. J. on Legis. 74 (1972).  
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States v. Serrano, 406 F.3d 1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“Every other Circuit, save the Third, has . . . held a district 
court does not have the inherent authority to grant a defense 
witness use immunity.”).  Other Courts of Appeals have 
adopted the prosecutorial misconduct theory, and evaluate 
whether the Government may be required to immunize a 
witness if necessary to protect the defendant’s right to present 
an effective defense; but none authorizes a district court to 
grant immunity on its own authority.  See, e.g., Curtis v. 
Duval, 124 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Turkish, 
623 F.2d 769, 772 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. 
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), superseded on 
other grounds by Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6); United States v. 
Talley, 164 F.3d 989 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v. 
Herrera-Medina, 853 F.2d 564 (7th Cir. 1988); United States 
v. Bowling, 239 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Westerdahl, 945 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1991); Serrano, 406 F.3d 
at 1217–18; United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216 
(11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Perkins, 138 F.3d 421 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998).  They have cited concerns of judicial competency 
to weigh immunity decisions and the Executive Branch’s sole 
authority to immunize under the federal immunity statute, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003.  See, e.g., United States v. Capozzi, 
883 F.2d 608, 614 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Every court of appeals 
which has considered the question has rejected the Third 
Circuit’s Smith holding as being a violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers.”).  Judicial use immunity has also been 
questioned by members of our Court.  United States v. 
Bazzano, 712 F.2d 826, 851 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc) (Adams, 
J., with Hunter and Becker, JJ., dissenting) (“Smith may have 
expanded judicial power too far.”).  
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 It is in this context that we revisit that aspect of 
Smith’s holding whereby courts have the inherent authority to 
immunize a defense witness.   
 
 C. Reconsidering Judicial Use Immunity  
 
 The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person 
shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant’s right “to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”  Id. 
amend. VI.  Fundamentally, “the Constitution guarantees 
criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted); Chambers v. 
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (“The right of an 
accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the 
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s 
accusations.”).   
 
 The Smith Court based its judicial immunity remedy 
on the conclusion that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause includes a right to present an effective defense.  
Although it cited the Sixth Amendment’s right to compulsory 
process, that alone does not entitle a defendant to request 
immunity for his witnesses.  United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment 
does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to 
secure the attendance and testimony of any and all 
witnesses.”); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) 
(“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel 
their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to 
present a defense . . . .”); Diggs v. Owens, 833 F.2d 439, 444 
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(3d Cir. 1987) (“In general a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right of compulsory process gives way when a witness he has 
subpoenaed invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.”); Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 467 (“[A] 
defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to such 
testimony.”). 
 
 We held in Smith that a court could bestow immunity 
on a defense witness to guard a defendant’s constitutional 
right to present an effective defense.  On revisiting the issue, 
we no longer believe this is a permissible use of judicial 
authority.  Congress has given the Executive Branch the sole 
authority to immunize witnesses; giving that power to courts 
intrudes on prosecutorial decision-making and goes beyond 
judicial expertise.  Moreover, we think the defendant’s right 
to due process is protected by retaining the effective defense 
test as a complement to our prosecutorial misconduct inquiry.   
 
  1. The Statutory Basis of Immunity 
 
 Immunity is a creation of the legislature, the body that 
defines criminal offenses and their sanctions.  It removes 
“those sanctions which generate the fear justifying invocation 
of the privilege,” Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 
(1956), and is akin to “an act of general amnesty,” Brown v. 
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 601 (1896).   
 
 Under the federal witness immunity statute, “no 
testimony or other information compelled . . . (or any 
information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony 
or other information) may be used against the witness in any 
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false 
statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order.”  18 
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U.S.C. § 6002.  This is known variously as use and derivative 
use, or use and fruits, immunity (shortened to use immunity 
throughout this opinion).  Congress has given the Attorney 
General the authority to exchange the protection of immunity 
for otherwise incriminating testimony when, “in his 
judgment,” a witness’s testimony “may be necessary to the 
public interest.”  § 6003(b).  Because this protection “is 
coextensive with the scope of the [Fifth Amendment] 
privilege against self-incrimination,” a Court can hold an 
immunized witness in contempt for refusal to testify.  
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).  
 
 Congress granted this authority to the Executive 
Branch because immunity is a prosecutorial tool.  Often those 
with pertinent knowledge about criminal offenses have 
engaged in unlawful behavior themselves.  Granting 
immunity enables the Government to elicit testimony that 
would otherwise be protected by the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination.   
 
 Congress has not given criminal defendants any 
similar power to seek immunity for their witnesses.  Nor has 
it authorized the federal courts to immunize a witness.  
Instead, under § 6002 a district court’s role is to grant 
immunity when it is requested by the Attorney General or his 
designee.  Though a court reviews the Government’s request 
for procedural compliance with the statute, it does not 
consider whether the Government has correctly determined if 
immunity is in the public interest.  Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 
459 U.S. 248, 254 n.11 (1983) (“Congress foresaw the courts 
as playing only a minor role in the immunizing 
process . . . .”); Herman, 589 F.2d at 1201 (“There 
is . . . overwhelming judicial and legislative authority for the 
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proposition that review on the merits of a federal prosecutor’s 
decision to grant immunity is barred by statute.”); see also 
United States v. Taylor, 728 F.2d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(describing this review as “ministerial”).   
 
 There are good reasons for immunity decisions to 
reside with the Executive Branch.  Often the decision to grant 
or deny immunity impinges on the Government’s “broad 
discretion as to whom to prosecute.”  Wayte v. United States, 
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
In any later prosecution, the Government bears a “‘heavy 
burden’” because it must “prove that its evidence against the 
immunized witness has not been obtained as a result of his 
immunized testimony.”  Turkish, 623 F.2d at 775 (quoting 
Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461).  In some cases, the Government 
may have already assembled the evidence it needs, or it can 
“sterilize” the immunized testimony by isolating those 
investigating or prosecuting the witness from any 
incriminating information provided through his testimony.  
Smith, 615 F.2d at 973.  But if these precautions are 
unsuccessful or unavailable, a court’s granting immunity to a 
witness to secure another’s criminal conviction may prevent 
the Government from ever prosecuting the witness for his 
own criminal behavior.   
 
 Courts are not in the best position to decide these 
prosecutorial tradeoffs.  “Such factors as the strength of the 
case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the 
Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s 
relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are 
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are 
competent to undertake.”  Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see 
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 467 (“Decisions to grant or deny 
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immunity are intimately tied to decisions regarding which 
perpetrators of crimes will be prosecuted, a core aspect of the 
Executive’s duty to enforce the laws.”); In re Daley, 549 F.2d 
469, 479 (7th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he relative importance of 
particular testimony to federal law enforcement interests is a 
judgmental rather than a legal determination, one remaining 
wholly within the competence of appropriate executive 
officials.”).  Giving judges the power to immunize witnesses 
“would carry the courts into policy assessments which are the 
traditional domain of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch.”  Thevis, 665 
F.2d at 639.  As Congress has given the power to immunize a 
witness solely to the Executive Branch, it is not a power 
courts can exercise.
2
  
 
                                              
2
 Our sister Circuits have also expressed a fear that judicially 
granted immunity “would be subject to abuse” by criminal 
defendants who could seek immunity for one another, each 
testifying that the other was not involved, or that one criminal 
defendant could take the fall for coconspirators by taking full 
responsibility at the others’ trials.  Thevis, 665 F.2d at 639–
40; Turkish, 623 F.2d at 775.  Though these witnesses subject 
themselves to perjury prosecution, the perjury statutes likely 
carry far lower sanctions, and therefore deterrence, than the 
charged offenses.  Thevis, 665 F.2d at 640 n.27 (“Nor are we 
convinced that perjury prosecutions are an adequate deterrent.  
Successful perjury prosecutions are not common, and in many 
cases the penalty for the substantive crime will far surpass 
perjury penalties.”).  Although we have recognized judicial 
use immunity for over thirty years and these fears do not 
appear as a problem to date, we recognize that the possibility 
of this kind of abuse further highlights the limits of judicial 
expertise in this area.  
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  2. The Lack of Support for Judicial Use  
   Immunity 
 
 In Smith, we justified judicial use immunity as 
“new only in the sense of its application” in that context.  615 
F.2d at 971.  We said that “[b]oth the Supreme Court [in 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968),] and this 
[C]ourt [in In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d 589 (3d 
Cir. 1978), and United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 
1977),] have previously found an inherent judicial power to 
grant witness immunity.”  Id.  We now believe this was too 
expansive a reading of those cases.  Simmons, and our cases 
applying its holding, Grand Jury and Inmon, permit a court to 
exclude a criminal defendant’s earlier testimony from trial in 
narrow circumstances.  This differs significantly from 
granting immunity to a defense witness when that witness has 
invoked the Fifth Amendment. 
 
 In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s 
testimony in support of his motion to suppress evidence on 
Fourth Amendment grounds could not be admitted against 
him on the issue of guilt at his later trial, as it is “intolerable 
that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in 
order to assert another.”  390 U.S. at 394.  We applied the 
logic of Simmons to hold that a defendant’s testimony offered 
to gain the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause, 
Grand Jury, 587 F.2d at 597, and the Double Jeopardy 
prohibition, Inmon, 568 F.2d at 333, could similarly not be 
used to prove his guilt at a subsequent trial. 
 
 Although the Court’s opinion in Simmons never uses 
the word “immunity,” courts—including our own—have 
analogized Simmons’ protection of testimony given at a 
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suppression hearing to a grant of immunity.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 116 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting that 
“Simmons v. United States authorizes the grant of use 
immunity,” thus a defendant could testify at a bail hearing 
without fear of incrimination); United States v. Bryser, 95 
F.3d 182, 186 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that “use immunity 
under Simmons” was not available at a resentencing hearing). 
 
  Simmons created an exclusionary rule (that is, it 
excludes a defendant’s testimony in an earlier hearing from 
being used at trial against him) when the criminal defendant 
would otherwise have to waive at the hearing his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  The 
Supreme Court has not extended Simmons beyond those facts.  
United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 866 (11th Cir. 2010).  
Simmons’ reasoning does not reach the facts of Smith; neither 
the defendants in that case nor the defense witness faced a 
conflict between two constitutional rights.  In addition, the 
protection afforded by the Supreme Court under Simmons 
(the exclusion from his trial of a criminal defendant’s 
testimony at a prior suppression hearing) does not present the 
same intrusion on prosecutorial discretion as does a judicial 
grant of immunity to a defense witness.  In other words, 
Simmons’ exclusionary rule does not extend a court’s power 
to invade the prosecutorial decisions discussed above.   
 
 Any possibility that the Supreme Court authorized in 
Simmons a general judicial authority to confer use immunity 
for non-defendant witnesses is undermined by its subsequent 
discussions of the authority to immunize witnesses.  In cases 
addressing grants of immunity, it is clear that the Court 
believes only the Executive Branch, and not the Judiciary, has 
the authority to immunize a witness.  In Pillsbury, the Court 
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held that a witness in a civil suit could invoke the Fifth 
Amendment during a deposition in which he was asked 
questions identical to those asked and answered under 
Government-sought immunity before a grand jury.  459 U.S. 
248 (1983).  Holding that the deposition testimony was not 
“derived from” the immunized testimony and hence not 
protected by the grant of immunity, the Court held that the 
trial court could not compel the witness’s incriminating 
answers because “only the Attorney General or a designated 
officer of the Department of Justice has authority to grant use 
immunity,” and “Congress gave certain officials in the 
Department of Justice exclusive authority to grant 
immunities.”  Id. at 248, 253–54, 261 (emphasis added and 
footnote omitted).   
 
 Similarly, in United States v. Doe the Government 
sought to compel document production through a promise not 
to prosecute but without obtaining immunity under the federal 
immunity statute.  465 U.S. 605 (1984).  The Supreme Court 
declined “to adopt a doctrine of constructive use immunity,” 
and refused to “extend the jurisdiction of courts to include 
prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the 
formal request that the statute requires.”  Id. at 616.  It 
explained that, under Pillsbury, prosecutors had the exclusive 
authority to grant immunity, as that decision “necessarily 
involves a balancing of the Government’s interest in 
obtaining information against the risk that immunity will 
frustrate the Government’s attempts to prosecute the subject 
of the investigation.  Congress expressly left this decision 
exclusively to the Justice Department.”  Id. at 616–17 
(citation omitted).  In a more recent discussion of immunity, 
the Court referred repeatedly to the Executive Branch’s 
authority to immunize a witness.  See United States v. Balsys, 
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524 U.S. 666, 682–83 (1998) (“[T]he government has an 
option to exchange the stated privilege for an immunity to 
prosecutorial use of any compelled inculpatory 
testimony. . . . The only condition on the government when it 
decides to offer immunity in place of the privilege to stay 
silent is the requirement to provide an immunity as broad as 
the privilege itself. . . . [T]he immunity option open to the 
Executive Branch could be exercised only on the 
understanding that the state and federal jurisdictions were as 
one.” (citation omitted)).  
 
 This language is no doubt dicta.  Yet “we cannot 
lightly ignore the force of Supreme Court dicta.”  Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 169 (3d Cir. 2013) (en banc).  “The 
Supreme Court uses dicta to help control and influence the 
many issues it cannot decide because of its limited docket.”  
In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000).  
“Appellate courts that dismiss these expressions . . . increase 
the disparity among tribunals . . . and frustrate the 
evenhanded administration of justice . . . .”  Id. at 612–13 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
  3. Judicial Use Immunity and Kastigar 
 
 Quinn urges us to uphold judicial use immunity, 
arguing that courts do not need authority to “grant” immunity.  
Instead, he believes the judicial power to compel testimony 
necessary to a defendant’s defense, on its own, carries 
immunity for that testimony.  Quinn reads Kastigar v. United 
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), to hold that testimony, once 
compelled, is necessarily immunized.  He explains “the Self-
Incrimination Clause by its own force confers immunity for 
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direct and indirect uses of the compelled testimony 
against . . . that witness.”  Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 6.   
 
 That is not correct.  In Kastigar, two witnesses were 
immunized under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 but refused to testify 
before a grand jury.  406 U.S. at 442.  They contended that 
the statutory protection was not sufficient to supplant the 
privilege and compel their testimony.  The District Court held 
them in contempt and the Supreme Court upheld that order.  
Id. at 453.  “[S]uch immunity from use and derivative use is 
coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and therefore is sufficient to compel testimony 
over a claim of the privilege.”  Id.  Testimony that would 
otherwise incriminate can only be compelled—that is, sought 
subject to contempt if not given—after the threat of criminal 
sanction is lifted.  That testimony is not automatically 
immunized because it is compelled; rather, if the witness 
claims the privilege, his testimony can be compelled because 
the federal immunity statute protects him from incrimination 
as a result of his testimony, the same protection afforded by 
the Fifth Amendment.   
 
 As we discussed above, only the Government has 
statutory authority to seek immunity.  And only when 
testimony is protected by immunity granted by the 
Government can a court compel that testimony.  The 
authority of a court to immunize a witness cannot be assumed 
from Kastigar.   
 
* * * * * 
 
 We know of no precedent (save Smith) to support use 
immunity grants by the Judiciary, as that right is reserved to 
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the Executive Branch.  In addition, we do not believe that 
judicial use immunity is necessary to protect the 
constitutional rights of the accused.  As explained in the next 
section, we believe that, when understood in its historical 
context, Smith proscribed prosecutorial misconduct and the 
test we created there to assess claims of misconduct remains 
both useful and worth keeping.  Thus, though we abandon 
judicial use immunity as a remedy, we keep the protection of 
due process provided through the test created in Smith.   
 
III. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Theory 
 
 The prosecutorial misconduct theory we recognized 
prior to Smith holds that the Government violates a 
defendant’s due process right to a fair trial if it acts with the 
deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process, such 
as by interfering with a defense witness through threats and 
intimidation.  Because it looks to Government action, this test 
is difficult to apply when the Government declines to grant 
immunity to a defense witness.  Smith crafted a new five-part 
test to address instances of Government refusal to immunize, 
with the aim of ensuring that a defendant is able to present a 
defense free from improper Government intrusion.  
 
 A. Our Holding in Morrison 
 
 The first case in our Circuit involving the prosecutorial 
misconduct theory was United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 
223 (3d Cir. 1976).  We held that the Government’s 
interference with a defense witness’s testimony violated the 
defendant’s guarantee of due process.  Id. at 228.  Morrison’s 
girlfriend intended to testify that she, and not he, engaged in 
the charged criminal conspiracy to distribute hashish.  Over 
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the course of the trial, the prosecutor sent several messages to 
the witness warning her that she could be charged for the drug 
crimes and perjury on the basis of her testimony.  Id. at 225.  
The night before her testimony, the prosecutor subpoenaed 
the witness and interviewed her in his office.  Accompanied 
by the law enforcement officers involved in the case, he again 
warned her of the dangers of testifying.  These warnings had 
their intended effect.  When called to testify, Morrison’s 
girlfriend invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.  Id. at 226. 
 
 We held that the prosecutor’s “repeated warnings[,] 
which culminated in a highly intimidating personal 
interview,” had “interfered with the voluntariness of [the 
witness’s] choice and infringed [the] defendant’s 
constitutional right to have her freely-given testimony.”  Id. at 
227–28.  Due process protects the defendant’s “right . . . to 
have [his] witness available as he finds him.”  United States v. 
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1978).  We vacated 
Morrison’s conviction and held that, if the witness invoked a 
privilege against self-incrimination during a retrial, the 
charges against Morrison should be dismissed unless the 
Government immunized the witness’s testimony under 18 
U.S.C. § 6002.  Morrison, 535 F.2d at 229.   
 
 Our holding in Morrison followed from the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972).  There, 
a trial court  
 
gratuitously singled out [the only defense] 
witness for a lengthy admonition on the dangers 
of perjury. . . . [T]he judge implied that he 
expected [the witness] to lie, and went on to 
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assure him that if he lied, he would be 
prosecuted and probably convicted for perjury, 
that the sentence for that conviction would be 
added on to his present sentence, and that the 
result would be to impair his chances for parole.   
 
Id. at 97.  The Supreme Court held that the judge’s remarks 
“effectively drove that witness off the stand, and thus 
deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 98.    
 
 Other courts have interpreted Webb similarly to hold 
that “[v]arious prosecutorial and judicial actions aimed at 
discouraging defense witnesses from testifying deprive a 
defendant of [his due process] right.” United States v. 
Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 400 (6th Cir. 2001); see also 
United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“‘[The prosecutor]’s warnings concerning the dangers of 
perjury cannot be emphasized to the point where they threaten 
and intimidate the witness into refusing to testify.’” (quoting 
United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325, 1334 (D.C. Cir. 
1982))); United States v. MacCloskey, 682 F.2d 468, 479 (4th 
Cir. 1982) (prosecutor’s “eleventh hour call” to primary 
defense witness “suggesting that she would be well-advised 
to remember the Fifth Amendment” is a due process violation 
under Webb that entitles the defendant to a new trial).   
 
 B. Prosecutorial Misconduct Beyond Morrison 
 
 Following Morrison, we defined prosecutorial 
misconduct as actions taken “with the deliberate intention of 
distorting the judicial factfinding process.”  Smith, 615 F.2d 
at 968; Herman, 589 F.2d at 1204.  This deliberate distortion 
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test applies when the Government has taken steps to interfere 
with the testimony of a witness who would otherwise be 
available to the defense.  For example, the prosecution has 
engaged in misconduct if the defendant can show that the 
Government’s “[i]ntimidation or threats . . . dissuade[d] a 
potential witness from testifying”—that is, “the 
[G]overnment’s conduct . . . ‘substantially interfered’ with a 
witness’s choice to testify.”  Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 
210, 260 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 
 But we have also used the deliberate distortion test in 
situations where prosecutors did not engage in overt threats or 
intimidation.  In Herman, we considered whether the 
Government’s selective immunization of prosecution 
witnesses, but not defense witnesses, violated the defendant’s 
due process rights.  589 F.2d at 1203–04.  Because the 
Government’s decision to immunize some witnesses and not 
others was based on its decision to prosecute them, and not on 
their testimony at Herman’s trial, we discerned no 
misconduct.  Id.  In Smith, we asked whether the prosecutor’s 
refusal to permit a defense witness to testify under a grant of 
immunity, when there was no interest in prosecuting him, was 
a deliberate effort to distort the factfinding process.  Smith, 
615 F.2d at 969.  We recognized that when the Government 
declines to seek immunity for a defense witness, it is difficult 
for a defendant to prove that the prosecution acted with the 
deliberate intention of distorting the factfinding process.  
Thus in Smith we also created a new five-factor test that 
focused on whether the defendant “is prevented from 
presenting exculpatory evidence which is crucial to his case.”  
Id.   
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 Although we characterized this test as distinct from an 
inquiry into prosecutorial misconduct, it is nonetheless about 
the Government’s trial decisions.  We wanted to know if the 
prosecutor was keeping exculpatory and essential testimony 
from trial solely to gain a tactical advantage against the 
accused.  If there were a governmental reason, unrelated to 
the defendant’s trial, for refusing immunity, we would not 
interfere with that decision.  If, however, the Government had 
no strong reason to keep exculpatory testimony from trial, we 
could overturn a resulting conviction.  See United States v. 
Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 777 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[Smith] was 
simply an instance of a prosecutor interfering, for no apparent 
reason, to suppress evidence that was about to become 
available to the accused.”).  A proceeding “[t]hat casts the 
prosecutor in the role of an architect,” instead of participant, 
does not “comport with standards of justice.”  Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963). 
 
 Other courts have not distinguished, as we did in 
Smith, the prosecution’s interference with a witness from its 
refusal to immunize a witness.  Instead, they have treated the 
Government’s refusal to grant immunity as a question of 
misconduct.  Blissett v. Lefevre, 924 F.2d 434, 442 (2d Cir. 
1991) (“Prosecutorial overreaching may also involve 
deliberate denial of immunity for the purpose of withholding 
exculpatory evidence and gaining a tactical advantage 
through such manipulation.”); United States v. Angiulo, 897 
F.2d 1169, 1192 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[T]he government could 
intentionally distort the fact-finding process by deliberately 
withholding immunity from certain prospective defense 
witnesses for the purpose of keeping exculpatory evidence 
from the jury.”); Hooks, 848 F.2d at 802 (considering whether 
“the government’s withholding of immunity distorted the 
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fact-finding process by keeping exculpatory evidence from 
the jury”); United States v. Frans, 697 F.2d 188, 191 (7th Cir. 
1983) (requiring a defendant to show “that the government 
intended to distort the judicial fact-finding process” by 
refusing to immunize a defense witness after immunizing a 
prosecution witness).   
 
 The five factors considered in Smith remain 
analytically helpful, as they capture those situations where the 
Government, for tactical reasons, has used its power to 
threaten prosecution and withhold immunity to keep 
exculpatory and essential testimony from trial for no strong 
countervailing reason.  This test fleshes out, and thus 
complements, Morrison’s metric of deliberate distortion.  For 
good reason this test also requires a more exacting showing 
than does the broader misconduct test.  When a defendant 
alleges that the Government’s refusal to immunize resulted in 
an unfair trial, he is challenging its statutory discretion in his 
case and possibly others.  If the defendant can show, as a 
prima facie matter, a witness’s testimony is available, clearly 
exculpatory, and essential—in effect showing that the 
prosecutor’s actions have impaired the ability to present an 
effective defense—we will consider the due process concerns 
raised regarding the Government’s discretion to grant or deny 
immunity.  The five-factor test aids this inquiry for 
prosecutorial misconduct, and we continue its use.  
 
 C. The Remedy 
 
 Once Smith’s five-part test is understood as a gauge of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the remedy for such a finding 
follows easily.  It is vacating the conviction and allowing a 
new trial where the Government can elect to exercise its 
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statutory authority to obtain a grant of immunity for the 
witness.  United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 526 (6th Cir. 
1984) (“The recommended remedy in such cases has been 
that a court . . . set aside the conviction and remand the case 
to afford the prosecutor an opportunity to immunize . . . .”).  
If the Government refuses to immunize the witness in 
violation of the defendant’s due process right, the trial court 
can dismiss the charges against the defendant.
3
     
 
 Courts sometimes refer to this remedy as “compelling 
the Government to immunize the witness,” id. at 468, but that 
is imprecise.  Dismissing the charges unless the witness is 
immunized leaves prosecutorial decisions in the hands of the 
Government.  It may grant immunity to the witness and 
attempt to convict the defendant in a fair trial, or it may 
decide that denying the witness immunity is more important 
to its goals than seeking that conviction.  But the remedy does 
not compel the Government to do anything.  It simply 
prevents prosecutors from obtaining a conviction through a 
process that lacks the fairness afforded by due process.  
United States v. Hooks, 848 F.2d 785, 799 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“[T]he prosecutor’s power to seek or to refuse to seek 
immunity is limited by the constitutional right to due process 
of the law.”). 
 
                                              
3
 While we do not deal in this opinion with a possible 
alternative to dismissal, we note the possibility in the rare 
case that another cure could correct the distortive effect.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476–77 (4th 
Cir. 2004) (appropriate substitute for witness’s testimony 
made available, so dismissal of charges not necessary). 
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 D. Bad Faith 
 
 The Government argues that any test for a due process 
violation must require the defendant to show bad faith on the 
part of the Government.  See United States v. Santtini, 963 
F.2d 585, 596–97 (3d Cir. 1992) (“As a general matter, even 
when actions by the prosecution appear to deprive a criminal 
defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense, no 
remedy will lie for such infringement absent a showing that 
the government has caused the unavailability of material 
evidence and has done so in bad faith.”).  The element of bad 
faith, however, does not require a defendant to show specific 
intent on the part of the Government to interfere with his due 
process rights.  See Morrison, 535 F.2d at 227 (“The good 
faith of the [prosecutor] would be relevant if he were charged 
with violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503[,] which makes the 
intimidation of a federal witness a criminal offense.  It is not, 
however, relevant to an inquiry into whether a defendant was 
denied his constitutional right.” (emphases in original)).   
 
 Our concern is with the effect of the prosecutor’s 
actions on the process afforded to the defendant.  “The Due 
Process Clause addresses the defendant’s right to a fair trial, 
not just whether the government intended to deny the 
defendant his rights.”  United States v. Straub, 538 F.3d 1147, 
1160 (9th Cir. 2008).  “If the suppression of evidence results 
in constitutional error, it is because of the character of the 
evidence, not the character of the prosecutor.”  United States 
v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976).  Courts should protect 
against deliberate wrongdoing by prosecutors and, in those 
rare cases where it arises, overzealous advocacy that distorts 
the factfinding function of a criminal trial.  
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 That said, prosecutorial misconduct is an area of the 
law requiring sensitivity.  Courts should be hesitant, absent a 
strong showing by the defense, to determine that the 
Government has engaged in misconduct by exercising its 
prosecutorial discretion and withholding immunity from a 
witness.    
 
* * * * * 
 
 To summarize, judicial use immunity impinges on the 
separation of powers between the Executive and Judicial 
Branches of our Federal Government.  The grant of witness 
immunity, reserved by statute to the Executive Branch, does 
not also reside with the Judiciary.  We overturn that portion 
of our holding in Smith that recognizes the authority of courts 
to confer immunity on a witness.  But we keep the test we 
created in that case, which we now recognize as 
supplementing our deliberate distortion test for prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The appropriate remedy if a defendant can prove 
misconduct is to allow the Government to seek immunity for 
the witness at retrial or have the charges dismissed.  With this 
revised legal framework, we turn to Quinn’s challenge to his 
conviction. 
 
IV. Quinn’s Appeal 
 
 In the District Court, Quinn sought immunity for 
Johnson to testify, claiming that Johnson’s testimony was 
necessary for him to present an effective defense.  Denying 
that immunity, Quinn contends, is a due process violation 
requiring a new trial.  “Ordinarily we review a denial of a 
motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.”  
United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993); cf. 
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United States v. Mike, 655 F.3d 167, 173 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“Ultimately, the question of whether clearly exculpatory 
evidence is necessary to present an effective defense is a 
decision calling upon the sound judgment of the district court 
judge in a position to listen to the witnesses and evaluate the 
tenor of trial narratives.”).  When the alleged violation 
includes “issues of law and fact[,] . . . we review the district 
court’s legal conclusions on a de novo basis and its factual 
findings under the clearly erroneous standard.”  Joseph, 996 
F.2d at 39; see United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 303 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  
 
 On appeal, Quinn argues for the first time that the 
prosecution engaged in misconduct by interfering with 
Johnson’s testimony.  He alleges that the Government’s 
motion to delay Johnson’s sentencing until after Quinn’s trial 
caused Johnson to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to 
testify.  Yet before trial Quinn expressly disclaimed an 
argument that the prosecution engaged in misconduct.  At 
argument on his motion in limine to have Johnson immunized 
by the Court, Quinn’s counsel agreed that the prosecutorial 
misconduct theory was not at issue because Quinn did not 
allege “the government [was] doing anything improper.”   
 
 Because he raises this argument for the first time on 
appeal, we review for plain error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); 
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).  We 
follow the four-step inquiry set out in United States v. Olano, 
507 U.S. 725, 732–36 (1993).  “First, there must be an error 
or defect—some sort of deviation from a legal rule . . . .”  
Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135 (alteration and internal quotation 
marks omitted).  “Second, the legal error must be clear or 
obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute.”  Id.  
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“Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s 
substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he must 
demonstrate that it ‘affected the outcome of the district court 
proceedings.’”  Id. (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 734).  Even 
when all three of these conditions are satisfied, there is a 
fourth step.  “[W]e will exercise our discretion to correct the 
unpreserved error only if . . . a miscarriage of justice would 
otherwise result, that is, if the error seriously affected the 
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”  United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 929 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). 
 
 A. Refusal to Immunize Johnson’s Testimony 
 
 We repeat for ease of reference that, to prove a due 
process violation on the basis of the Government’s refusal to 
immunize a defense witness, the defendant must show the 
following five elements. “[1] [I]mmunity must be properly 
sought in the district court; [2] the defense witness must be 
available to testify; [3] the proffered testimony must be 
clearly exculpatory; [4] the testimony must be essential; and 
[5] there must be no strong governmental interests which 
countervail against a grant of immunity.”  Smith, 615 F.2d at 
972.  The first two are not disputed.  Quinn requested that 
Johnson be immunized and he was available to testify.  We 
note, however, that there is no evidence that Quinn directed 
his immunity request to the Government.  Going forward, 
defendants must seek immunity for their witnesses from the 
Government, not the district courts.  In the unusual posture of 
this case—where we have kept the analytical test but no 
longer recognize a district court’s ability to immunize a 
witness—we will assume, from the Government’s opposition 
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to Quinn’s motion in limine, that it would have refused to 
immunize Johnson if asked. 
 
We start with the requirement that Quinn show that 
Johnson’s testimony is clearly exculpatory, i.e., that it would 
exonerate or free him of guilt or blame.  Testimony that is “at 
best speculative,” United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 251 
n.8 (3d Cir. 1983), “severely impeached” by the witness’s 
prior inconsistent statement(s), United States v. Perez, 280 
F.3d 318, 348 (3d Cir. 2002), ambiguous on its face, Smith, 
615 F.2d at 972,  or “even if believed, would not in itself 
exonerate [the defendant],” United States v. Lowell, 649 F.2d 
950, 965 (3d Cir. 1981) (emphasis omitted), is not clearly 
exculpatory.  
 
Quinn and Amicus Curiae, the National Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers, urge us to be less exacting in our 
requirement that evidence be clearly exculpatory.  They argue 
that immunity should be available if the evidence is 
“materially favorable to the defense on the issue of guilt,” 
Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 19, or “could contribute 
substantially to raising a reasonable doubt,”  Amicus Br. at 
11.  We continue to be guided (as was the Smith Court) by the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Chambers v. Mississippi.  It 
required the State of Mississippi to abrogate otherwise 
appropriate evidentiary rules when they prevented the 
defendant from presenting essential testimony.  410 U.S. 284 
(1973); see also Lowell, 649 F.2d at 964 (noting Smith’s 
reliance on Chambers).  Although rules of evidence often 
exclude testimony that a defendant believes is materially 
favorable or would contribute to raising a reasonable doubt of 
guilt, the Chambers line of cases permits abandoning those 
rules when they “infringe upon a weighty interest of the 
37 
 
accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes 
they are designed to serve.”  Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 
U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (alteration and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  A weighty interest exists when the Government’s 
decision not to immunize the testimony of a defense witness 
blocks the defendant’s ability to present a meaningful 
defense; that is, with the evidence he might disprove the 
Government’s case, without it he cannot.     
 
This case requires us to clarify two of our cases 
discussing the clearly exculpatory part of the Smith test.  We 
have held that a witness’s testimony “undercut” or 
“undermine[d]” by evidence presented by the Government 
was not clearly exculpatory.  United States v. Thomas, 357 
F.3d 357, 365–66 (3d Cir. 2004); Mike, 655 F.3d at 172.   To 
avoid any misunderstanding as to those terms, we note that 
the obvious purpose of exculpatory evidence is to contradict 
the Government’s evidence against the accused.  It is hard to 
imagine a case in which a defendant’s evidence of his 
innocence is not, in some respect, undermined by the 
Government’s evidence of his guilt.  The existence of 
conflicting evidence does not affect, however, whether the 
defense evidence is exculpatory, though it may affect its 
weight.  Thus, though exculpatory on its own, defense 
evidence that is overwhelmingly undercut or undermined by 
substantial prosecution evidence in the record becomes so 
lacking in credibility that it cannot be clearly exculpatory.   
 
In this case, Johnson’s testimony is not clearly 
exculpatory.  First, we do not know the contents of Johnson’s 
testimony.  Quinn offered no proof that Johnson would offer 
exculpatory testimony at all, let alone clearly exculpatory 
evidence.  In any event, Johnson’s putative testimony would 
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be overwhelmed by the evidence of Quinn’s guilt presented 
by the Government.   
 
Quinn points to Johnson’s statement to police on the 
afternoon of the robbery that Quinn was not involved in the 
robbery.   Even if Johnson testified consistently with that 
statement—a matter in doubt—its believability is undermined 
by his additional statement that he did not want to discuss the 
involvement of Quinn because the latter is the brother of 
Johnson’s fiancée.  Their familial connection provides 
Johnson with a reason to shield Quinn from suspicion and 
guilt.  Johnson’s credibility would be eroded in other ways as 
well.  Johnson had already pled guilty to his role in the bank 
robbery, and thus would have been subject to the accusation 
that any exculpatory testimony was his effort to “take the 
fall” for a friend and codefendant.  After his arrest, Johnson 
gave inconsistent statements to the police, first telling them 
that he walked to the shopping center where he met Quinn, 
then reporting that he was driven there by a friend.  He also 
told police that he called Quinn from the shopping center 
parking lot, but call records presented at trial showed that no 
calls were made from Johnson’s phone to Quinn.  In addition, 
the Government would have attacked Johnson’s credibility by 
presenting evidence of his prior convictions for theft and 
fraud.   
 
Most important, Johnson’s testimony would be 
overwhelmed by the Government’s case against Quinn.  He 
called Johnson numerous times on the morning of the 
robbery, and then deleted records of those calls before police 
obtained his phone.   He hid his car out of sight of the bank 
while Johnson committed the robbery, and the robbery 
occurred close to Quinn’s relative’s house, where Quinn 
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drove immediately after Johnson obtained the money.  Also, 
two of Quinn’s cellmates presented direct evidence that (i) he 
boasted about planning and participating in the robbery and 
(ii) he hoped to get away with the crime by claiming that only 
Johnson was involved.   
 
 This is not an instance where the defense witness’s 
testimony (even assuming it were given as Quinn hopes) 
would make suspect the Government’s case.  See Smith, 615 
F.2d at 966–67.  Considering these items of evidence 
together, we cannot conclude that Johnson’s testimony was 
clearly exculpatory.  Because Quinn has not made this 
showing, we do not need to consider whether Johnson’s 
testimony was essential or whether the Government had a 
strong countervailing interest for refusing to grant Johnson 
immunity.  (The latter avoids our scrutinizing the 
Government’s prosecutorial decisions unless necessary to do 
so.)  
 
  B. Delay of Johnson’s Sentencing Hearing 
 
 We next turn to Quinn’s claim that the Government 
engaged in deliberate distortion of the factfinding process by 
delaying Johnson’s sentencing hearing.  As mentioned, we 
review for plain error.  “If an error is not properly preserved, 
appellate-court authority to remedy the error (by reversing the 
judgment, for example, or ordering a new trial) is strictly 
circumscribed.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134.  We “correct only 
particularly egregious errors.”  United States v. Young, 470 
U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 We start with whether there is error that is clear.  The 
Government’s motion to continue Johnson’s sentencing is not 
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akin, in either quantity or quality, to the repeated and 
intimidating reminders of criminal exposure imposed on the 
witnesses in Morrison or Webb.  Quinn has presented no 
evidence that Johnson intended to testify on Quinn’s behalf 
but was dissuaded from that testimony by the Government’s 
motion.  Indeed, Johnson took no position on the delay of his 
sentencing, and informed the Court that he would invoke his 
Fifth Amendment privilege if called to testify, apparently 
without regard to the timing of his sentencing hearing.   
 
 In addition, Quinn typically must “have [his] witness 
available as he finds him.”  United States v. Herman, 589 
F.2d 1191, 1199 (3d Cir. 1978).  When he first sought 
Johnson’s testimony, Johnson was awaiting sentencing.  The 
Government’s motion for continuance merely maintained that 
state of affairs after Quinn’s successful motion to delay his 
trial.  Johnson was available to Quinn exactly “as he [found] 
him” id., prior to the delay of trial.  We discern no distortion 
of the factfinding process, and thus no prosecutorial 
misconduct or error that is clear. 
 
 Quinn fares no better on the third and fourth steps of 
our plain error inquiry.  He has not demonstrated that 
Johnson’s testimony would have changed the outcome of his 
case or that the absence of this testimony affected the 
integrity, fairness, or public reputation of the judicial 
proceedings here.  Even assuming that Johnson would have 
testified that Quinn was uninvolved (which, again, we do not 
know), we are not persuaded, for the reasons explained 
above, that it would have altered the jury’s finding of guilt.  
Quinn had the opportunity to present a full defense against 
the Government charges, including (as he did) by taking the 
stand in his own defense.  “The jury had before it all the facts 
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and claims appellant intended to elicit from the witnesses for 
whom he sought immunity.”  United States v. Alessio, 528 
F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976).  We cannot say that Quinn’s 
trial was unfair because it lacked Johnson’s testimony.  
 
 Finally, Quinn also argues, for the first time in his 
Supplemental Brief filed for our rehearing en banc, that the 
District Court erred by finding that Johnson properly invoked 
his Fifth Amendment privilege without requiring that he take 
the stand and invoke the privilege as to specific questions.  
Because this issue was not raised in Quinn’s notice of appeal 
or opening brief, it is waived.  Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(5); 
United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1993).  
Even if it were not, Quinn acknowledges there is no plain 
error here, Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 23 n.16, as he 
does not challenge Johnson’s right to claim the privilege. 
 
V. Conclusion  
 
 The prosecutorial misconduct test from our pre-Smith 
cases—deliberate intent to distort the factfinding process—
provides a due process guard against Government 
interference with a defense witness.  The Smith five-part test 
aids in this analysis when the Government exercises its 
statutory authority not to immunize a witness for the defense. 
 
 Our holding today departs from Smith, however, by 
eliminating the grant of a judicially imposed remedy of use 
immunity to a defense witness.  Courts lack that authority, as 
immunity is a statutory creation reserved to the Executive 
Branch.  If the accused can show a due process violation, a 
trial court has the authority to vacate a conviction to allow a 
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new trial where the Government may immunize the witness’s 
testimony or, if the Government won’t immunize, to dismiss 
the charges.  
 
 Applying our revision to this case, Quinn fails to show 
that the Government interfered unconstitutionally with 
Johnson’s decision not to testify.  We thus affirm.  
 
